Chinggis Khan's Last Campaign as Seen by the Tanguts

All so far known sources on Genghis (Chinggis) Khan, irrespective of the language they had been written in, were meticulously studied and today it seems we know everything about Genghis Khan's life and his military success and hardly anything new may be added. The only exception is the last period of Genghis Khan's life — his last campaign (1226-1227) and his death in course of this campaign — which still appears to be rather obscure. This period in Genghis Khan's life is inseparable from the Tangut Empire (982-1227) — "The Great State of White and Lofty" (= The Great State of Yab-Yum) ¹, since the aim of Genghis Khan's last campaign was the Tangut state itself and the mystery of his death which seemingly occurred on the territory of the Tangut state, is closely associated with the mystery of the fall of the Tangut empire. But never before a single Tangut written source has been used to reconstruct the last Genghis Khan's march, and this was and still is taken for granted, since it is widely held that all Tangut historical records have perished in flames of Mongol invasion. However, there are some Tangut indigenous texts (see Appendix) which though not representing historical records, show how the Tanguts themselves saw the dramatic events which had preceded the 1226-1227 campaign. On the grounds of information extracted from these Tangut texts I would like to focus on the events of 1225, the year which preceded the beginning of the last Genghis Khan's march.

But first of all let us look at what is written on this subject in Chinese and other languages' sources.

1. Chinese-language materials

The "Secret History of the Mongols" (henceforth the "Secret History") which was written in 1240 ² in Mongolian language but survived in Chinese transliteration, claims that 1226-1227 Mongolian campaign against the Tanguts was a punishment because the Tanguts had broken their promise (Dao 1980, pp. 351-352 and 355) ³ to join forces with the Mongols in their Central Asia campaign in 1218 (ibid., pp. 316-317) ⁴. However the "History of Yuan dynasty" (Yuan shi, compiled in 1370) which obviously represents the official point of view specifies these promises in the following way: "In the 21st year [of Genghis Khan's reign] in the first moon of the spring [1225] the emperor himself [Genghis Khan] at the
head of the army attacked Xi Xia for sheltering [his] enemy Chilahexiangkun and not sending [Xi Xia ruler’s] son as a hostage” (juan 1, p. 10 (7242)). As we see, Yuan shi only briefly states the two facts, but does not give any details. And it is worth noting that Yuan shi first speaks about the sheltering of an enemy and second — about the refusal to send a hostage not specifying the exact date of these two events. But on the grounds of the wording one gets an impression that the sheltering of the enemy had happened before the hostage problem.

The cited passage from Yuan shi shows 1) the significance of the campaign for Genghis Khan, since it is stressed that Genghis Khan himself led the army; 2) the sequence of the events — first the enemy was sheltered and then the hostage was not sent.

Thus, according to the official Chinese historiography there were two reasons for Genghis Khan to raise his troops against the Tanguts:
1) they gave shelter to his enemy Chilahexiangkun;
2) they refused to send a hostage.

There is one more Chinese source which gives us a rather lengthy version of the same events. It is Wu Guangcheng’s *Xi Xia shu shi* (*Xi Xia shu shi jiao zheng* 1995) published in the 1820’s, exactly six hundred years after the campaign at issue here. In my study I use extensively Wu Guangcheng’s materials 5.

According to Wu Guangcheng (*Xi Xia shu shi jiao zheng* 1995, p.493) in the eleventh moon, 1224, the last but one Tangut emperor Xianzong, Weiming De-wang (henceforth De-wang) (r.1223-1226) sent an envoy to the Mongols expressing a wish to capitulate (?) and as a sign of his loyalty he promised to send his son as a hostage to the Mongols. Three months later in the third moon of the spring, 1225, a Mongolian envoy arrived at the Tangut court to fetch the hostage.

It was Botu from the Mongolian tribe *yigiresu* (?) who for many years followed Genghis Khan 6. Botu was related to Genghis Khan by marriage — first he married Genghis Khan’s only sister, Tiemulun, and later, after her death, he married Genghis Khan’s daughter (the “Secret History” defines him as Genghis Khan’s close relative — son in law ’). He died of illness in 1227 during the military campaign against the Tanguts. We may suppose that in 1225 Botu was already an old man. His high position is, I believe, very significant, since it reflects the importance of the mission in the eyes of both, the Mongols and the Tanguts.

De-wang was hesitating. Two Tangut officials were insisting on sending his son to the Mongols. One of them, the right chancellor Gao Lianghui, who had just (1224, tenth moon) made peace with Jin state, said: “Honesty and confidence are the most important in relations between two countries. The Mongols are strong and we are weak. In this situation it is impossible to break the promise. It is better to send [a representative of] the imperial family [to the Mongols]. It would be wise to supply [him] with all the signs of the ruler’s [power] and the carriage banners and paizi will fasten up [our relations with the Mongols]. They will rejoice and one may hope that gradually the state disaster will lessen”. Another
Tangut official Li Yuanji backed up Gao Lianghui saying: «The Mongol wild beasts... (?)»

But De-wang did not follow the advice of his officials and refused to send his son as a hostage, thus breaking his promise.

The same 42nd juan of Xi Xia shu shi includes the story about the Tangut sheltering Chilahexiangkun, an enemy of the Mongols. Contrary to the Yuan shi, it has an elucidating comment and it seems worthwhile to give here the whole passage from Xi Xia shu shi: «In the ninth moon [of 1225] an enemy of the Mongols, Chilahexiangkun, escaped in [Tangut state, where he] was accepted. [Comment:] Chilahexiangkun was the son of the Naiman's head, Kuchlug, ruined by the Mongols. Kuchlug took a flight into [Khara] Khitai [state where he] died. The ruler of the Mongols (i.e. Genghis Khan) was looking for Kuchlug's son, Chilahexiangkun, but [he] took a flight into Xi Xia. De-wang accepted him, since they had a common enemy and supplied him with provisions — both dried and fresh» (Xi Xia shu shi jiao zheng 1995, p. 495). I believe that this passage from Xi Xia shu shi is crucial for the understanding the situation at issue here, since it provides the researcher with a very important information lacking in Yuan shi, to wit, the fact that Chilahexiangkun himself was not the enemy of Mongols, he was the son of the Mongolian enemy, Kuchlug, who perished in 1218, i.e. seven years earlier. Kuchlug and De-wang's son both were killed by one and the same person — Genghis Khan. And, as we see, the comment especially stresses the fact that De-wang and Chilahexiangkun had a common enemy. The dating of the events in Xi Xia shu shi shows that the hostage episode had happened in the third moon, 1225, whereas the harbouring of Chilahexiangkun by the Tanguts took place six moons later — in the ninth moon of the same year.

Thus, comparing the information taken from Yuan shi with that from the Xi Xia shu shi shows:

1) the different sequence of the two events;
2) Xi Xia shu shi speaks about giving shelter to the son of an enemy, but not to the enemy himself.

So far I have touched upon only Chinese-language materials. It seems that sources written in other languages do not adduce any reasons for the Mongolian invasion. The famous Persian historian of the beginning of the 14th century Rashid al-Din says nothing about the Tangut hostage or sheltering the enemy as well. Even the «Secret History», despite it being very attentive to the Tangut-Mongolian wars, gives no information about a Tangut hostage or sheltering an enemy, which both preceded the 1226-1227 campaign. However I would like to draw attention to the paragraph 268 in the «Secret History», since the vagueness of the wording here may conceal any hints including those we are interested in: «Because Tangut people had given a promise and did not carry it out, Genghis Khan once more attacked them. Having subdued Tangut people Genghis Khan returned. In the Pig year he ascended Heaven» (Dao 1980, p. 355). Hence on the grounds of Chinese sources and the lack of information on the subject in other
languages’ sources we may conclude that in spring 1225 De-wang had refused to send his son as a hostage to Mongols, and because of that, at this time there was no Tangut heir-hostage sent to Mongols.

2. Tangut-language materials

Quite surprisingly, among Tangut indigenous texts I have found two independent references to the eldest son of the Tangut emperor (the heir), a boy, sent in spring 1225 to the Mongols as an envoy (hostage). It means that despite the fact that the official Chinese historiography keeps silent about the Tangut hostage, thus creating an impression that there was no Tangut heir-hostage at all, nowadays on the grounds of the Tangut texts one may claim that the Tangut hostage, the eldest son of the emperor, did exist and, even more, as the Tangut source asserts, was later put to death by the Mongols. It seems the Tanguts had their own vision of the events prior to the 1226-1227 Mongolian campaign which was quite different from what we know from Chinese-language sources.

The two Tangut texts which mention the boy-hostage, are held in the Manuscript Department of the Institute of Oriental Studies in St. Petersburg, Russia. These texts, as I have already said, do not represent historical records. They are:

1) a report of a military commander of Khara-Khoto dated second moon, 11th day (March 21), 1225 (Tang. 8185);
2) a ritual song «The Song how the Sacred Might overcomes all the Neighbouring Peoples», undated, supposedly the beginning of the 14th century (Tang. 25).

The first text undoubtedly is to be regarded as a very reliable source, since it is an official report of a military, the commander of the Black City (Khara-Khoto, site of the famous P.K. Kozlov’s finds of 1908-1909) garrison.

The second text represents a sacred piece of poetry, performed (sung) during some certain rituals still unknown to us. Being a sacred text it would hardly include any inaccuracy (e.g., the historical personages mentioned in this song are given in the correct chronological order — Genghis Khan — Tangut heir-hostage — ’Phags-pa Lama 9). I believe that we have every reason to regard the ritual song as an entirely reliable source, additional reason being the fact that the information given in the Tangut song shares some ideas and expressions with the respective Chinese records (for details see below). It is to be stressed that these two Tangut texts not only complement each other, but they sometimes even give the same information, e.g., in both cases the heir-hostage is named as “the eldest son”, he is an envoy (= hostage). Having pieced together the information taken from both texts we get the events of spring, 1225, as they were seen by the Tanguts (the description of these two Tangut texts, their translation and comments are given in the Appendix, p. 22-37):
When the strangler from the underworld Blacksmith Thunder-peal (or blacksmith Thunder) (=Temujin) had appeared, the eldest son of the Tangut emperor, Ugly person-Rainbow, age under ten, was sent as an envoy (= hostage) to the Mongols. He was given a golden paizi. A Tangut official with a silver paizi accompanied him. They were escorted by a Mongol envoy (envoys — not clear; could it be Botu) left especially for this purpose. The commander of the Khara-Khoto garrison Su-wei Pagoda-Iron received information from several sources including a document from the Holder of the golden paizi about his arrival. Su-wei Pagoda-Iron wrote a report dated the second moon, eleventh day (March 21st), 1225, addressed to the Tangut envoy. Seemingly in Khara-Khoto the Holder of the golden paizi had to change the horses. Su-wei Pagoda-Iron reported that fresh (?) horses were ready. He was warning that the enemy (not named, but obviously Mongols) were staying near the border in one day from Khara-Khoto and that they looted during the nighttime. Pagoda-Iron was worried how the Holder of the golden paizi would pass the rout from Suzhou to Khara-Khoto. He advised the Holder of the golden paizi to enter the steppe immediately without staying overnight in Khara-Khoto. He listed all the precautions undertaken: thus, the border emissary informed the city superintendent that each house along the envoy's route had been prepared for reception of Holder of the golden paizi. In conclusion Su-wei Pagoda-Iron stated that he himself would come to the border when the Holder of the golden paizi would be there (?). Later the wild beasts (the Mongols) put the boy-envoy to death. He turned into a carrion in the steppes and his bones lie unburied there.

Here I would like to attract reader's attention to one of the lines of the ritual song (14 characters) — "wild beasts had killed [the boy-envoy, his body] turned into a carrion in the steppes and his bones [still] lie unburied there". Obviously this was intended to rouse strong feelings against the Mongols. For one thing, — an envoy killed by those who were to accept him, was indeed an extremely rude offense of the rules, which regulated the relations between the states. Thus, it seems that Wu Guangcheng not for nothing had included a special comment on the practice of sending hostages: "From ancient times on, when there is no trust while joining into a union, then an oath is taken; if the oath is not trusted, then a son is sent as a hostage. If one promises to send a son as a hostage, but does not send, then one has to surrender and he does not deserve confidence either. De-wang broke the promise he had given at first, and [thus] insulted [the Mongols] later. [He] did not carry out the promise and thus hastened the disaster, did he?" (Xi Xia shu shi jiao zheng 1995, p. 493). Such an explanation, no doubt being quite correct, is rather superficial. More significant was the seemingly disgraceful for the Tangut fact stressed in the ritual song, — the bones still lie there, in the steppes. In this connection it is necessary to call up the well known episode with
Jamuqa, Genghis Khan’s sworn brother (the "Secret History", paragraph 201): «... [Genghis Khan] issued a decree saying that [Jamuqa] should be put to death without his blood being shed and that his bones should not be abandoned in the open but buried decently. [So] there he did away with Jamuqa and had his bones buried" (Urgunge Onon 1990, p. 110). It seems that precisely this fact was most irritating, perhaps even unbearable, for the Tanguts. It seems that a certain symbolic meaning underlies this attitude towards the bones of a deceased. As for shedding the blood, we know for sure that according to shamanistic notions, blood was supposed to be the abode of the soul (Vladimircov 1998, p. 137), — thus, if blood was shed, the soul was injured as well. But as to the unburied bones of a deceased, I could not find an explanation why it was regarded inadmissible. Certainly it was a violation of the funeral ceremony — the eldest son of the Tangut emperor, a would-be Tangut emperor, was to be buried at the foot of the Helan mountains (Kepping 1994, p. 370). Perhaps — and such a notion shared by many religions is self-evident — if bones are lying unburied the spirit of the deceased is not in peace. However there might be some additional ideas unknown to me.

It is necessary to stress that Tangut texts confirm the information of Chinese-language sources. A Tangut official, Gao Lianghui advises De-wang to give a paizi to the envoy (Xi Xia shu shi jiao zheng 1995, p. 493) and out of the Tangut military report we know that the envoy had a golden paizi and the official who accompanied him had a silver paizi, i.e. De-wang had followed Gao Lianghui’s advise to send the hostage and to supply him with a paizi. Another example, perhaps not so convincing as the previous one, is the collocation "wild beasts" attributed to the Mongols in the speech of the Tangut official Li Yuanji in Xi Xia shu shi: the same collocation in connection with the Mongols is repeated in the Tangut ritual song.

Thus, on the grounds of Tangut language sources we may conclude that in spring, 1225, De-wang had sent his son as a hostage to the Mongols and they killed him.

As to Chilahexiangkun, so far I have not found any mentioning of him in Tangut texts.

3. Losing a son — adopting another: an attempt to resettle?

Having put together the information from Chinese and Tangut sources we have all grounds to reconstruct the events of 1225 as follows:

1) 3rd moon — Tangut emperor, De-wang, sends his eldest son as a hostage to the Mongols.
2) The hostage perishes.
3) 9th moon — De-wang shelters Chilahexiangkun, the son of Kuchlug, chief of the Naiman tribe, who was killed by Mongols in 1218.

It is necessary to note the discrepancy of dating the hostage episode: Su-wei Pagoda-Iron's report states that the hostage arrived in Khara-Khoto in the second moon, whereas Wu Guangcheng gives the third moon for De-wang's refusal to
send his son to the Mongols. However, one thing is clear — the hostage crisis happened in the spring, 1225.

Undoubtedly the second moon of the official report is the correct date (I will return to this problem below).

It seems there is a certain "cause and effect" relationship between the two events: having lost his own son killed by the Mongols De-wang gives haven to the son of Kuchlug who himself was murdered by the Mongols. Since it is known that Kuchlug was killed long ago (1218), we may suppose that De-wang had had a certain purpose when in 1225 he gave shelter to Kuchlug's son and that his acceptance of the Naiman ruler's son definitely represented a symbolic act and, even more, a ritual act: having lost his own son De-wang "substitutes" another man's son for his own son. The mystical relationship which seems to connect the "father" (De-wang) and the "son" (Chilahesiangkun) may be explained by the fact that one and the same person — Genghis Khan — killed respectively the son of the former and the father of the latter (mind the expression in Xi Xia shu shi — because they "had a common enemy").

A fascinating explanation of the Tangut hostage story was suggested by my colleague professor M.I. Nikitina 10. She drew my attention to a ritual procedure in the ancient Korean state Koguryo, since, in her opinion, the Tangut hostage story fits in the description of this ritual procedure which reproduces the myth of the Mother-Pig and her Son. This myth and the respective ritual were reconstructed by Nikitina (1996) on the grounds of Korean and Chinese sources among which Kim Busik's Samguk Sagi 11 is to be named first.

The formation of the Koguryo state lasted for about seven centuries (37 B.C.—668 A.C.). Founded in the south-west part of Manchuria by energetic mounted people who belonged to the Fu-yu (Korean: Pu-ye) cultural unity, it immediately began to expand its territory southwards. And not once in course of these long centuries Koguryo was faced with the necessity of transferring the capital. The ritual which precedes the transferring of Koguryo capital, represents a very complicated procedure. The preparations had to be made beforehand — it took a calendar year and sometimes even a few years.

The ritual begins with the escape of the sacred animal, the pig, which hitherto was held indoors. The pig personifies the heir. The pig is chased and at last is found in a certain place. In this place the ruler's dwelling will be built. This is how the place for the capital is chosen 12.

In course of this ritual three moons are decisive — the 3rd, the 9th and the 10th. In the 3rd moon the pig runs away; in the 9th moon ruler's son destined to be the heir, is born; and, at last, in the 10th moon the capital is transferred.

While describing the ritual, Samguk Sagi shows two possibilities in carrying out the ritual: 1) a successful, when the capital is transferred in due time, 2) not successful, when something odious happens, e.g. the heir dies, and because of that the capital cannot be transferred in due time. We are interested in the second possibility (not successful one) which, according to the Koguryo annals (Kim Busik 1995 juan 13, pp. 39—40, text in literary Chinese p. 415-416), had happened in Yuri-wang's reign
(19 B.C.—8 A.C.): Yuri-wang’s son, the heir, died in the spring, 1 A.C. and because of that the ritual had to be postponed, — without the heir the ritual (and consequently the transferring of the capital) could not be performed. It was performed a year later, in the 2 A.C., and the capital was successfully transferred in the 10th moon, 3 A.C. Below is the text from Samguk Sagi 13.

In the 14th year (6th year B.C.)
In spring, the first moon, Teso, wang of Pu-ye, sent an envoy and demanded [Yuri-wang’s] son to be sent as a hostage. Being afraid of Pu-ye’s might, [Yuri-wang] decided to send Todzhol, his heir, as a hostage. But Todzhol had been frightened and did not go. Teso became furious. In winter, eleventh moon, Teso with a 50000 army encroached upon [Koguryo. But] there was a big snowfall, a lot of men were frozen to death and he went away.

In the 19th year (first year B.C.)
In autumn, eight moon, the pig destined to be sacrificed, ran away. Wang ordered Thannee and Sabee to catch it. They found it in the Chanokthek marshes and cut its tendons of its feet with a knife. When wang heard about it, he got angry and said: ”How did they dare to injure the animal destined to be sacrificed to the Heaven?” Then he threw them both into a pit and killed them. In the ninth moon wang fell seriously ill and the soothsayer said: “Thannee and Sabee revenge themselves”. Wang had ordered to propitiate them and recovered.

In the 20th year (first year)
In spring, the first moon, the heir Todzhol died.

In the 21st year (2 year A.C.)
In spring, the third moon, the pig destined to be sacrificed, ran away. Wang ordered chansen Sol’zhi to run down it. [Sol’zhi] caught it near the Kukne rock Veenam and drove it to Kukne people [and asked them] to feed it. When [Sol’zhi] returned, he said to wang: ”Chasing the pig I reached the Kukne rock Vinaam. I saw that the mountains were forbidding and the rivers were deep and the land was suitable for growing the five grains. There dwells a lot of deer, fish and tortoises. If wang transfers the capital to that place, he will not only give the people a happy and a well-to-do life, but will get rid of war disaster”. In summer, the fourth moon, wang was hunting in the Veezhung forest. In autumn, the eighth moon, an earthquake occurred. In the ninth moon wang made his way into Kukne to inspect the place. On his way back near the Samul’thek lake he met a young man sitting on a stone in (?) the lake. The young man said: ”I would like to be your servant”. Wang rejoiced and gave him the name Samul’ [i.e. he was named after the lake] and the surname Vee.

In the 22nd year (3rd year A.C.)
In winter, the tenth moon, wang had transferred the capital to Kukne and built there the stronghold Veenam.
As we see, when Yuri-wang’s heir had died, it proved impossible to transfer the capital. The heir was replaced by a young man, whom Yuri-wang gave a surname and a name (in a ritual giving a name to a person means giving birth to him). Thus, the young man became equal to Yuri-wang’s own son. And immediately after that the capital was transferred.

The fact that there did exist such a Korean ritual which preceded the transfer of the capital, is corroborated by the record for the year 209 A.C. (Kim Busik 1995, juan 16, pp. 65-66, text in literary Chinese p. 473-477), where the scheme of the same ritual manifests itself again:

- the 3rd moon — unborn heir is in mortal danger;
- the 9th moon — the heir is successfully born;
- the 10th moon — the capital is transferred.

Mind that this case is also an example of "not successful" (=not in due time) transferring of the capital, because of the lack of the heir. The preparations took six months: for the 203 A.D. is stated that the ruler had no son and for the 208 A.D. the story about "the pig destined to be sacrified" which ran away, is repeated.

Professor Nikitina believes that Koguryo ritual gives us a clue for understanding the Tangut situation: in the 3rd moon of the spring, 1225, De-wang’s eldest son (heir) is taken as a hostage; he leaves on horseback and perishes. In the 9th moon De-wang gives shelter to the son of Naiman ruler, who seemingly has to substitute De-wang’s own son.

Thus, the events in the Korean myth (losing son — adopting another man’s son) and their dating (third moon — ninth moon) both coincide with that of the Tangut story which happened twelve centuries later. It seems we may suppose that in keeping with the arrangement of the Koguryo ritual, the same ritual preparations were made by the Tanguts and, thus, their capital was to be transferred in the 10th moon, 1225.

Now let us look at what Wu Guangcheng says for the tenth moon, 1225. The Xi Xia shu shi states:

"In the tenth moon of the winter, [1225], Luo Shichang, xuanhuishi of the Southern court, resigned. ([Luo] Shichang who himself went as an envoy to Jin and returned, had seen that Jin’s power was lessening with every passing day. In his appellations to the Tangut emperor he used to state that it was impossible to reckon on Jin. [Luo Shichang] advised De-wang to rely upon his own power. As to Chilahexiangkun, De-wang did not follow [Luo Shichang’s] admonition [not to harbour him]. Because of that [Luo Shichang] petitioned for resignation. He had done it three times and only after that he was allowed [to resign]. [Luo] Shichang’s family lived for generations in Yinzhou county. [When Yinzhou] was defeated, the family moved to Yulongzhou. Knowing that the [Tangut] state was about to perish, [Luo Shichang] compiled "A List (?) of Emperors of Xia state" and hid [his composition consisting of] twenty juan “ (Xi Xia shu shi jiao zheng 1995, p. 495)."
Before examining the cited passage, it is necessary to introduce more information on Luo Shichang. As a Tangut envoy, this Tangut high-ranked official visited Jin state three times: in 1198, ninth moon, as a *xuandelang*; in 1208, second moon, as a *guanwendian daxueshi*; and, as we already know, in 1225, tenth moon, as a *xuanhuishi*. Mind that in all three cases Wu Guangcheng supplies Luo Shichang’s name with his official rank: according to Korean material (Nikitina 1996, pp. 116-117) the fact that a person's rank is indicated, shows the significance of the functions performed by the person.

Thus, nearly for thirty years Luo Shichang witnessed the state of affairs in Jin. And we may suppose that it was not by chance that exactly Luo Shichang had been entrusted with a delicate commission to negotiate with Jin about the possibility of 'transferring the capital', i.e. the possibility to resettle ('give the people a happy and a well-to-do life, [and]... get rid of war disaster', as it is declared in Samguk Sagi).

Now let us return to the passage in *Xi Xia shu shi* which relates the events of the tenth moon, 1225, the moon when the transfer of the capital supposedly had to take place. Having returned from Jin, Luo Shichang reports to the Tangut emperor that, first, Jin's power is lessening with every passing day and, second, that Tangut emperor should rely exclusively on his own power. Thus, we may suppose that despite the fact that everything had been arranged in keeping with the demands of the ritual, the transfer of the capital (= resettling in Jin) proved to be impracticable. The failure of Luo Shichang's mission is clearly seen in his petitions for resignation. Especially revealing are the following words: "Knowing that the [Tangut] state was about to perish, [Luo Shichang] compiled 'A List (?) of Emperors of Xia state' and hid [his composition consisting of] twenty juan" (Xi Xia shu shi jiao zheng 1995, p. 495).

Thus, it appears that during his visit to Jin in the tenth moon, 1225, Luo Shichang came to the conclusion that the resettlement was impossible and, because of that the Tangut state had no future. Wu Guangcheng's text for the tenth moon, 1225, creates an impression that exactly this moon, 1225, and not two years later, as it is widely held, was the time when Tangut state had been finally and completely overcome by the Mongols.

4. Jin state as the place for Tangut resettlement

In 1225 in the face of the approaching Mongol massacre numerous examples of which obviously were well known to Tanguts, no wonder, they again (twice in their history they had had an experience of resettling) were looking for a place where to move to. By the end of 1225 the west was out of question, since all the neighbouring states in that direction had been already subdued by the Mongols. The only direction Tanguts could move to, was the east, to wit, the Jin territory. And, as we know, it was precisely the east where they had moved during their previous resettlements and lived successfully for centuries. That is why we may suppose that in 1225 the relations with the Jin state were of utmost importance for the
Tangut state and Wu Guangcheng’s list of main events for 1225 (Xi Xia shu shi jiao zheng 1995, pp. 493-495) is quite revealing in this aspect:

Song Li-zong, Bao-qing the first year; Jin, Zhengda the second year; Mongol Tai-zu the twentieth year;

Xia, Gan-ding the second year.
(1) Spring, the third moon. Mongol envoy came to take the son [of the Tangut emperor] as a hostage. [The hostage] was not sent.
(2) Summer, the sixth moon. [The planet] Tai-bo was seen in the daytime.
(3) Autumn, the seventh moon. Li Zheng entered Jin [state].
(4) [Autumn], the eight moon. A [Tangut] envoy was sent to pay a visit to Jin to negotiate again for a peace treaty (?)
(5) [Autumn], the ninth moon. An enemy of the Mongols, Chilahexiangkun, took flight into [Tangut state, where he] was accepted.
(6) Winter, the tenth moon. Luo Shichang, xuanhuishi of the Southern court, resigned.
(7) [Winter], the eleventh moon. Jin envoy came to return a visit.
(8) [Winter], the twelfth moon. Tangut-Jin markets were reopened.

As we see, out of the eight moons of 1225 marked by events significant for the Tangut Empire, four moons (7, 8, 11, 12) mention the Jin state. And in comment for two more moons (6 and 9) the name of the Jin state appears again. Thus, in one way or another six moons out of eight are connected with the Jin state. Only two moons – the third and the tenth – lack any reference to the Jin state. And precisely these two moons are significant in the Korean state ritual discussed above. It is not clear, whether it is just a coincidence or there was a certain taboo for the naming the two crucial in the ritual procedure moons. However that may be, the importance of relations with Jin for the Tanguts during the year preceding Genghis Khan’s last campaign is undeniable. Let us look more attentively at the events which happened according to Wu Guangcheng after the third moon and before the tenth moon, i.e. in the interval between the two, as I have named them, crucial in performing the ritual procedure moons.

In the sixth moon (the first moon to be mentioned after the third moon when the hostage was not sent) the planet Tai-bo was seen in broad daylight. It is known (Dr. Ju.L. Kroll, personal communication, March 14, 1999) that the planet Tai-bo (Venus) in ancient times (2nd–1st centuries B.C.) was associated both with war and the regions to the north or north-west inhabited by the barbarians. At the same time Tai-bo was regarded as a personification of the yin (from the pair yin-yang). In the 13th century these regions were inhabited among others by the Mongols. Thus, the appearance of the Tai-bo may designate an evil omen, predicting the inevitability of a war with the Mongols. However out of the comment it becomes clear that despite of the evil omen De-wang had no intention
to surrender. He had asked his officials to give explanation of this phenomenon and zhong-yu-fu Zhang Kong-fu enumerated seven points of handling the state affairs which included the necessity of:

1. assembling the defeated Tangut soldiers, as well as the dispersed civil population and supplying them with food and clothes;
2. carrying out all the treaty promises;
3. repairing the towns' walls and moats in order to fortify the defence system;
4. constant military training;
5. establishing a system of sentinels linked together without any interval, so that no one could enter the state. An envoy was to be sent to the Jin state to make an agreement about border sentinels which are to be put on state borders by both states and help each other against the enemy;
6. saving army provisions, since there were no agricultural works because of war;
7. raising the spirit of the people, which can be done by arranging resistance to the Mongols.

It seems that the list of 1225 events as compiled by Wu Guangcheng, supplies us with an additional argument in favour of the supposition that the Tanguts wanted to resettle in Jin. Significantly, the first step in Tangut arrangements to resettle in Jin which had begun in the seventh moon, was a dispatch to the Jin state a representative of the royal Weiming house, a boy whose name was Li Zheng (Li was the surname the Chinese (Tang court) gave to the Dangxian (Tangut) rulers at the end of the ninth century). The comment explains that because of the instability in the Tangut state Li Zheng's father did not get his promotion. He took his son and entered Jin to give him a proper education. Thus, it means that at this time Jin state was still regarded as a quiet place where an education could be received (obviously contrary to the Tangut situation). When Li Zheng grew up, he was regarded as a hostage. He served the Mongols and became a distinguished general (Xi Xia shu shi jiao zheng 1995, p. 494; Yuan shi, juan 124, p. 355 (7587)). One may suppose that the sending of the boy from the Weiming family may be explained as an attempt to secure the continuity of imperial succession.

Perhaps, one more argument supporting the idea of Tangut resettlement may be found in the "Secret History" (paragraph 265): when in 1226 Genghis Khan had fallen from a horse and became ill, the reason put forward by his officials for leaving alone for a time being the Tanguts, was the fact that it was impossible for the Tanguts to go away, because of their walled cities which they could not take on their shoulders. By 1226 the rumours about the Tanguts' intention to resettle could well reach Genghis Khan's ears, so we may regard the words of Mongolian officials as a response to Genghis Khan's unwillingness to interrupt his campaign.
5. Epilogue

The analysis of relevant Tangut and Chinese sources made in this study shows that for 1225, the year preceding the beginning of the last Genghis Khan's campaign, we may reconstruct the following events:

1. De-wang did send his son, a boy under ten years of age, as a hostage to the Mongols;
2. The boy-hostage was murdered by the Mongols;
3. De-wang sheltered Chilahexiangkun, Kuchlug’s son, thus substituting his own son killed by the Mongols, because the ritual of transferring the capital (= ritual of resettlement) demanded the presence of a son-heir;
4. In the face of upcoming catastrophe De-wang had made all ritual preparations to resettle in the Jin state, but he failed 15.

It, however, seems that already by the end of 1225 the Tanguts were destined to be exterminated and whether they had agreed to join forces helping Genghis Khan in his Central Asian campaign or not, whether they would send a hostage or not — it made no difference. The desperate state of affairs in the Tangut state was correctly estimated by Luo Shichang who as early as the end of the 1225 had completed a list of Tangut rulers showing that there would be no more of them. And in this situation one can only admire Tangut's brave willingness to find a way out of a hopeless situation. My study has shown that in the official source (Yuan shi) the events preceding the last Genghis Khan’s campaign were given (intentionally ?) in the reverse order. Only Wu Guangcheng's Xi Xia shu shi had retained the correct order (first the hostage was sent to the Mongols and then Chilahexiangkun, Kuchlug's son, was sheltered). Thus, Wu Guangcheng's text gave us the opportunity to reveal the underlying state ritual recorded in Korean and Chinese historical records which usually had preceded a transfer of the capital and then to extrapolate it to the Tangut situation. Seemingly in the course of time, the system of ideas which had underlain the Tangut world-outlook and, no doubt, was known by adjacent peoples, gave place to another set of ideas and we may suppose that in the 19th century Wu Guangcheng was just faithfully copying the sources he had at his disposal without real understanding of the links between the facts.

And it is to be noted that in the eyes of some modern Chinese scholars, the figure of Chilahexiangkun does not fit to be mentioned in 1225 (really, a son of the Naiman ruler, Kuchlug, killed eight years ago, – what he could do in the events preceding the last Genghis Khan's march against Tanguts?) and they believe that Chilahexiangkun mistakenly stands here for Ilahexiankun, son of Kereyid chief, who in 1203 flew to Xi Xia (Xi Xia shu shi jiao zheng 1995, p. 502, n. 3). As a result, Chilahexiangkun is not even included into the reference literature (see, for example, Cai Meibiao ed. 1986) (however such solution of the problem seems rather doubtful).
Thus, by the 20th century the ideas underlying the appearance of Chilahexiangkun, son of Kuchlug, in ritual preparations for a resettlement had obviously been lost and were revealed only by chance.

Here I would like to touch upon one more problem — the reliability of Chinese dynastic histories while relating the Tangut history. First of all one has to keep in mind that the Tanguts were devoid of their own dynastic history (while Khitans and Jurchens both have a separate dynastic history) and the explanations given for the absence of the Tangut dynastic history seem not quite satisfactory (however this problem deserves a special study).

Some years ago while discussing the original name for the Tangut state "The Great State of White and Lofty", which never occurring in Chinese dynastic histories (the fact which by itself is rather significant), was used exclusively in Tangut indigenous writings, I stated that the Chinese dynastic histories compiled during the reign of the last Yuan (Mongolian) emperor in the second half of the 14th century consisted of "only the facts which those who destroyed the Tangut state wanted us to know" (Kepping 1994, p. 374).

The study of the hostage story has corroborated this idea showing that in some cases the dynastic histories keep silent or, as in our case — misinterpret, some significant, but for some reasons undesirable for the Mongols, historical facts connected with the Tanguts. Was there anything special about the Tangut hostage that made the Mongol rulers cross out this episode? Perhaps because, first, an envoy, as is known (Vladimircov 1998, p. 185) was regarded by the Mongols as a sacred person, and, because of that, inviolable. Murdering of an envoy, in Mongolian eyes, was a heinous crime, an extremely rude offense of all agreements between the states. Second, the situation was worsened by the fact that the envoy-hostage was not a grown-up person, but a little boy under ten years of age, the son of the ruling Tangut emperor and his heir.

But could these considerations stop Genghis Khan who used to leave hills of corpses behind him? So far I prefer to leave this question without an answer.

Notes
1 Tangut indigenous name for their state never used in Chinese dynastic histories; for details see Kepping 1994.
2 It is widely held that the «Secret History» was compiled in 1240, however there are conflicting opinions: some scholars date it to 1228 (Urgunge Onon 1990, p. VII), while others even to 1264 (Rosen 1989, p. 270).
3 The «Secret History», paragraphs 265 and 268. The Chinese text of the «Secret History» I have used (Dao 1980) lacks the numbering of the paragraphs.
4 The «Secret History», paragraph 256.
5 Wu Guangcheng’s work is regarded by some modern western scholars (e.g. Dunnell 1991, p. 184, note 50) as unreliable the reason being that his data is not corroborated by other sources and because of that Xi Xia shu shi is not taken into account. Not being trained as a historian I do understand that the facts are to be
corroborated by different sources. But the information on Genghis Khan's last years is so scant and mute that it would be rather unwise to disregard any bit of it. And seemingly, if the information given by Wu Guangcheng is lacking in other sources, it does not obligatory mean that he himself had invented it. I suppose that Wu Guangcheng was using material which is lost by now, but regrettably he himself did not specify the sources he had used.

4 See Botu's biography in Yuan shi, juan 118, p. 341 (7573).
5 The «Secret History», paragraph 120.
6 The story of the Tangut heir-hostage or, as R. Dunnell puts it, «a hostage crisis» was already examined by R. Dunnell (1991, pp. 176 and 184 n. 50). Using as a source material the data given inYuan shi (and bearing in mind the silence on this subject in the «Secret History») she comes to the following conclusion: "Never in their long history, to my knowledge, had the Tanguts submitted a hostage prince to any court, and evidently the emperor [Dewang] now choose to uphold this proud tradition, whatever the consequences" (1991, p. 176). Thus, in Dunnell's opinion, in 1225 in particular, the Tanguts «refused to yield a hostage prince to the Mongols» (1991, p. 161). As to the data on the Tangut hostage adduced in Wu Guangcheng’s book, R. Dunnell considers it as "based on hearsay and imaginative reconstruction" (ibid., p. 183, note 50) (see also note 5).
7 There is one more historical personage in this list, but so far I could not identify him.

8 Professor Marianna I. Nikitina, a leading researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies (St. Petersburg, Russia) on the grounds of Korean and Chinese sources for many years is reconstructing the system of myths which underlies the ancient Korean state rituals. Her ground-breaking monographs (1982, 1994) and recent articles (1996, 1997) give a new perspective not only for Korean, but the whole Far-Eastern studies as well, since the meticulous study of the indigenous sources undertaken by her, reveals the ancient world-outlook common for the whole area.

10 Kim Busik (1075–1151), a high official at the Koguruo court, published Samguk Sagi (History of the Three Kingdoms) in 1045. It was an officially sanctioned history. By the 12th century ideas reflected in Samguk Sagi, could be well known in the Tangut Empire.

12 Nikitina believes that the Koguryo ritual can be traced back to the well-known ancient Indian ritual asvamedha in course of which a horse was set free. In the place where the horse stopped, the ruler's headquarter was placed. The replacement of a horse by a pig in the Koguryo ritual she explains as a result of the influence of the Tunguss peoples dwelt in Manchuria.

14 Translating the text of Samguk Sagi into English I have intensively used the Russian translation of it made by M. N. Pak (Kim Busik 1995). All the proper names and geographical denominations are given according to his translation.
15 The west always was regarded by them as a sacred place (Kepping 1996) and they kept in mind (it is reflected in Tangut ritual songs) that about a century ago it had been exactly westward that the Khitans managed to move to and were quite successful in establishing a new dynasty.
16 What was the reason of his failure — either he did not manage to come to terms with the Jin state, or it was too late to find a way out, we do not know and perhaps, will never know.
APPENDIX: TANGUT TEXTS

Both Tangut texts translated with comments below, belong to the P. K. Kozlov’s collection held in the Manuscript Department of the Institute of Oriental Studies (St. Petersburg, Russia). However, nowadays an adequate understanding (and consequently a correct translation) of Tangut indigenous texts, is still questionable, since we do not know a lot of realities concerning the everyday Tangut life, not to mention the lack of a thorough study of the Tangut language itself and I would like to ask the readers to look upon my translation of these texts as tentative. It goes without saying that because of the importance of their contents, these texts will attract scholars’ attention again and again. No doubt, in the nearest future the translation of these texts will be performed much more adequately than it was done here.

A. Military report (March 21, 1225)¹

(Tang. 8185)

Description of the MS

A perfectly preserved manuscript, 19.3 x 45.5 cm.

The MS was restored in the 1960’s and the original condition of the paper has changed because of being pressed and moistened. Nowadays the paper is greyish-yellow. It is compact, rigid and uneven. The thickness of the paper is about 0.16 mm. Net No. 17 (Catalogue Laid Lain Counter, Tokyo Research Institute of Cultural Property). (N. M. Brovenko, artist-restorer of the Institute of Oriental Studies, St. Petersburg, personal communication, November 9, 1999).

The text (altogether 284 characters) is written in 19 lines each complete line containing 16-17 characters. Lines 1, 4, 17, 18 and 19 are incomplete:

- Line 11. The name of the sender of the report, his position and rank (incomplete from the top, altogether 12 characters present);
- Line 14. Tai-tou preceding the text of the report itself (at the beginning of the line one character’s space left out);
- Line 17. The end of the report (incomplete from the bottom, altogether 8 characters present);
- Line 18. The name of the addressee and the formula used at the end of reports (for details see below) (incomplete from the bottom, altogether 11 characters present);
- Line 19. Date and signature (incomplete from the top, altogether 9 characters present, between the date and the signature a two characters’ space).

Standard handwriting, except for four characters written in cursive. They are: line 3, the 2nd character; line 4, the 15th character; line 16, the 8th character; line 18, the 4th character. Seemingly all four cursive characters represent one and the
The reconstruction of the text 6

Translation 7


L.2. Today, the eleventh day of this moon [March, 21, 1225], the prescription brought from the Suzhou 12 the Holder of the golden paizi, the one who is in charge of the frontier affairs,

L.3. the Son 13, a report from Yizhu Fengan [county] 14 and a message from the military inspection of the Western Court 15, [all these sources] inform that 16 the Holder of the golden paizi, the eldest son of the emperor 17, acting as an envoy, has set out. Together with the holder of silver paizi and accompanied by envoys left by the enemy especially for this purpose, [the Holder of golden paizi] having passed Yizhu 18 is approaching Khara-Khoto. This is the information received. Relay horses and special harness (?) 19 are already prepared for [the Holder of golden paizi].

L.7. Having received the document, [I], Pagoda-Iron, personally set at once out in order to reach [Black River city] earlier, since [I] am the person who has in his hands all the military power and who deals with all the errors both in managing lands, water, agriculture and in organizing the defense of the city. The enemy are near the border
L.10. in one day [from Khara-Khoto. If the Holder of the golden paizi] stays overnight, [there is a danger that the enemy may] attack at night, since the people who have just come having fled [the Mongols] say that
L.11. [the Mongols] attack those who roam due to spring agricultural works. Such are the rumors. If [the Holder of the golden paizi] will not stay and immediately will go into the steppes,
L.12. in case of appearance of any deficiency, the disaster will be inevitable. That is why [we] have to be thoroughly prepared for reception.
L.13. The border emissary in charge of little towns has reported to the [Black River] city superintendent Ngwe-zwei Servant-Mountain that every house along the route
L.14. is prepared for reception of [the Holder of golden] paizi. There is no deficiency and the route is save(?) 20. First of all [I] have
L.15. respectfully asked deputy prefect 21 A-riu Double?-Mountain to send reports with those who are familiar with the barbarian's [i.e. Mongolian]22 [language?].
L.16. When the Holder of the golden paizi having set out will come near [the border?, I], Pagoda-Iron,
L.17. will come there at once. Irrespective of it being just or unjust 23.
L.19. Heavenly Stability (Qian ding), the Year of Hen (1225), second moon, Pagoda-Iron.

Considering the information from the report

By the time of sending his report (the second moon, 1225) Su-wei Pagoda-Iron had been holding the post of the military commander of Khara-Khoto at the best only for a half of a year, since the previous military commander of Khara-Khoto had named him as a possible successor in his report which was dated the seventh moon, 1224 (i.e. only seven moons earlier) (Kychanov 1971, p. 193).

However, it seems that by the spring, 1225, Pagoda-Iron was the only person who remained in power in Khara-Khoto ("[I] am the person who has in his hands all the military power and who deals with all the errors both in managing lands, water, agriculture and in organizing the defense of the city"). And it seems that he himself stayed not in Khara-Khoto, but somewhere outside Khara-Khoto, for he stated in his report that he would reach Khara-Khoto earlier than the Holder of the golden paizi. If we recall both the report of Pagoda-Iron's predecessor whose complaints of food shortage had been made as early as in the seventh moon, 1224 (mind also his insistent petition to be transferred far inland) (Kychanov 1971, p. 193) (certainly by the spring next year the situation could only be worse) and the first point in zhong-yu-fu Zhang Kong-fu's list compiled in the sixth moon, 1225, of what was to be done in Tangut State ("the necessity of assembling the defeated Tangut soldiers, as well as the dispersed civil population and supplying them with food and clothes", (see above), we have all grounds to suppose that by the
spring, 1225, Khara-Khoto was abandoned by the citizens, as well as the authorities. Notwithstanding the desperate situation, Pagoda-Iron reported about all possible measures he had undertaken for the boy-envoy's security. Revealing is the fact that he did not advice the Holder of the golden paizi to stay overnight in Khara-Khoto, for even on the territory of the Tangut state it was dangerous because of possible Mongolian raid.

Thus, Pagoda-Iron fully realized the hopeless situation and the inevitably fatal destiny of the boy, the Holder of the golden paizi.

What has attracted my attention in Pagoda-Iron's report, is his wish to come to the border when the boy will be passing it. It seems to me that he had a daring plan to resque the boy when he would be already on the other side of the border. And he asks for a reply from the Holder of the golden paizi, however at the same time stating that he will come in any case.

Certainly the last paragraph is to be looked upon as my supposition.

B. Ritual Song (beginning of the 14th century)

(Tang. 25)

Tang. 25 is really something special, since this wood-block print containing several ndzo "odes", has on its reverse side a collection of kia ritual songs written in a cursive handwriting. About thirty of ritual songs have come to us in this wood-block print.

I believe it was not by chance that Tangut ritual songs which seemingly represent Tantric secret knowledge transmitted orally from teacher to pupil, were written on a reverse side of a wood-block print containing Tangut odes: the choice of the text where the ritual songs were to be written down, was quite deliberate, since in one and the same book we get Tangut poetry — odes, supposedly openly performed at the Tangut court, and ritual songs, the secret knowledge.

The poetry represents indeed the most tempting and fascinating part of Tangut written heritage, regrettably still mostly beyond comprehension which is due to many factors, and first of all, the lack of knowledge of the Tangut world-outlook underlying the poetry. The secret (ritual) language (Kepping 1996) used in some poetical genres creates another obstacle for the researcher.

In one of the ritual songs, namely, "The Song how the Sacred Might overcomes all..." I have found four lines (45 characters) mentioning Genghis Khan and the Tangut heir-hostage. The content of the song touches upon several historical personages given, as I have already said above, in correct chronological order: Genghis Khan, Tangut heir-hostage, Phags-pa Lama. Regrettably, (I have also said it above), I could not identify one of the personages mentioned in the song and this means that so far I lack a full understanding of the song's content. Not daring to present a half-baked translation of the whole song which inevitably will only add to the wishful ideas about the Tanguts (such ideas abound in the respective literature), nevertheless I venture a publication of an extract from this song, the four lines which contain the names of Genghis Khan and the Tangut heir-hostage.
But first let us turn to the technical characteristics of the wood-blockprint (Tang. 25). The wood-block print, 25 x 16.5 cm, originally in "butterfly" binding. Today for convenience of reading of both sides of the wood-block print, the "butterfly" binding was undone and each "butterfly" page was put into a separate plastic envelope.

Because of the improper method of the restoration made in the 1960's, nowadays it is impossible to define the original condition of the paper. Obviously the paper was pressed, stretched and steeped in glue (made of flour or gelatine). On the edges of the paper there are layers of paper used for restoration. Nowadays in the middle of the pages the colour of the paper is dark-grey and at the edges it is dark-yellow. The thickness of the paper: in the middle of a page about 0.135 mm; at the edges (together with the paper used for restoration) about 0.25 mm (N. M. Brovenko, artist-restorer of the Institute of Oriental Studies, St. Petersburg, personal communication, November 9, 1999).

According to the colophon cut at the end of the text of the odes, the wood-block print was cut in 1185-1186, to wit, in the reign of Renzong, Weiming Renxiao (r. 1139-1193), the period which is usually regarded as the golden age of the Tangut Empire. Obviously the ritual songs are to be dated to a later period. The content of some of them shows that they were written not earlier than the beginning of the 14th century (for example, the song at issue here mentions Phags-pa Lama's death which occurred in 1280).

"The Song how the Sacred Might overcomes All the Neighbouring People" consists of 33 lines 30 of them being full and three shortened. A shortened line (three characters) shows a turning-point in the song or (six characters) – the end of the song. A full line has 14 characters (7 and 7) with a caesura after the fourth character in each seven-syllabled phrase:

_ _ _ _ / _ _ _ _ _ _ _ / _ _ _

Translation

L.1. And when
L.2. Blacksmith Thunder, the evil strangler [from] the underworld, had appeared in a way one could not avoid [him].
L.3. Ugly [person]-Rainbow, the eldest son of the emperor, aged under ten, went as an envoy to the horse.
L.4. Being put to death by the wild beasts [he] turned into a carrion in the steppes and his bones still lie there.

Considering the information from the ritual song

In the ritual song one and the same construction is used to describe both Genghis Khan and the Tangut heir: for each of them a half of a full line (seven characters) is given, their position (blacksmith – eldest son) and the name (three
characters) stand after the caesura, preceded in both cases by a four-character attribute:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1-2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>/</th>
<th>5-6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>underworld</td>
<td>strangler</td>
<td>evil</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>blacksmith</td>
<td>Re</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3-4</th>
<th>/</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ten</td>
<td>year</td>
<td>before</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>the eldest son of the emperor</td>
<td>Ugly</td>
<td>Rainbow</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Genghis Khan is named in the ritual song by the name given to him at his birth—Temujin. The "Secret History" states (paragraph 59) that it was the name of a Tatar who was captured when Genghis Khan was born. Significantly, there is nothing in the song that points to the fact that he is a khan—in the eyes of the Tanguts, he is just a blacksmith, a strangler full of malice who does not deserve any respect. It appears that he is contrasted with the emperor's eldest son, the heir, a boy less than ten years old.

In the Tangut ritual song Genghis Khan is named blacksmith Re the word "blacksmith" (literally: "metal" + "to do") being expressed in the secret language — mbin'ie. Thus, Tangut ritual song corroborates the well known opinion that in Old Mongolian Genghis Khan's name—Temujin—meant "blacksmith". As to the last character in Genghis Khan's name—re, it seems that it was his proper name. According to the dictionary "The Sea of Characters" (Kepping et al. 1966, part 1, p. 407, No. 2501) re means "marsh". However, the word re seemingly stands here for its homophone — re "peal of thunder" (Li Fanwen 1986, p. 471, 53B41 and 53B38). Thus, one may claim that in the Tangut material Temujin meant "blacksmith Thunder". An indirect corroboration for such understanding one may get from Chinese transcription of "Temujin": the dictionary Zhongguo lishi da cidian. Liao, Xia, Yuan shi (Cai Meibiao ed. 1986, p. 409) transcribes "Temujin" as 'Tie-mu-zhen (lit. iron, wood, truth)' 34. And the last character in Chinese rendering of "Temujin" — zhen "truth" is homophonous with the word zhen "thunder" their tones only being different. The song defines Genghis Khan as "the evil strangler from the underworld". One may get here the provenance of the word "Tartars" (from "Tartarus") used in Europe for centuries to refer to the Mongols. Judging by the Tangut material we may suppose that because of his terrible cruelty Genghis Khan was perceived as "the one who came from the underworld". Later such a definition was used to designate Mongolian troops and, at last, the whole people.

As to the word "strangler" applied to Genghis Khan—it may hint to the fact that the heir-hostage was suffocated, not put to the sword, since, according to Mongolian notions, the blood of the high-ranked enemy (no doubt, Tangut heir-
hostage belonged to this category) should not be spilled on the ground (cf. the story of Jameqa, Genghis Khan’s anda, or blood brother).

The song states that Temujin appeared in a way that one could not avoid him. We know the Tanguts were performing certain rituals to avoid disasters (Nevskij 1960, 1, p. 52), but in this case they failed. That is why it is said «one could not avoid him».

Now let us turn to the lines connected with the heir-hostage. Just as in the case of Genghis Khan the hostage’s name occupies the three characters standing after the caesura. The key-word which gave us the opportunity to identify the person named Ugly Rainbow as the heir-hostage is the word po «the eldest son [of the emperor]». This word is used in the report written by Su-wei Pagoda-Iron (see line 4 of the report and note 29). And the four-character attribute in this case is — «aged under ten». Importantly the Tangut heir-hostage receives one more full line describing his fate. Thus, the Tangut heir-hostage was considered a person in any case no less significant than Genghis Khan, but judging from the number of characters describing both of them even much more esteemed than Genghis Khan: there is one full line for Genghis Khan and two lines for the heir-hostage. Obviously the analysis of the four lines of the song reveals its meticulously considered construction, no doubt, inherent in the whole song.

Appendix notes

1 This military report was already translated by E.I. Kychanov (1977), however my understanding of the document differs from that of Kychanov’s. (See also Kychanov 1989, p. 178).

2 «List of Tangut characters» was not found. (Compiler.)

3 Since Kychanov’s publication of the report lacks the reconstruction of the text, the only way to find out how he reconstructs the shape of this cursive character, is the analyses of the transcription and the meaning of the character given by Kychanov. Obviously he reads the cursive character as ldiei «sovereign» (Rus. povolitel) (see Kepping et al. 1969, part 1, p. 340, No. 2068).

4 See Kepping et al. 1969, part 2, p. 41, No. 3432.

5 The idea of correspondence between the rhymes of the first and second tones in Tangut language belongs to Professor S. E. Yakhontov (St. Petersburg University, Russia).

6 The reconstruction of the report’s text, as well as its transcription, was not found. (Compiler.)

7 Due to the different word order in Tangut and English, sometimes there is no precise correspondence between a given line in the Tangut text and its translation.

8 Tu-*ion is a designation of an army officer which seemingly means "the one who is in charge of a thousand people armed with iron weapons" (literally: "a thousand iron [weapons]"). Both syllables of the word tu-*ion do not have their own lexical meaning and are usually used as "transcriptional characters" (the list of Tangut transcriptional characters see in Kepping 1983, pp. 131-139). The first syllable tu is very close both in shape and reading to the numeral "thousand" — tu, and the second syllable is homophonous with the word "iron" — *ion (Kepping et al. 1966 part 1, p. 291, No. 1726
"iron" and No. 1730 "transcriptional character"). The same rank had the person who had preceded Su-wei Pagoda-Iron as the military commander of Khara-Khoto (see Kychanov 1971, p. 191). It seems that only a tu-*iron (obviously a high officer's rank) could be in charge of all military affairs in Khara-Khoto.

The military position mbie-mbiu ("assistant" + "commander") I translate as "commander-assistant" perceiving the noun "assistant" as an apposition to the word "commander". However E. I. Kychanov translates it as "deputy commander".

Black River City, or Khami-Khoto, was situated in the north-western part of the Tangut State near the border (modern Inner Mongolia, Edzina hoshun). Exactly here in 1909 the famous Russian Central Asia explorer colonel P. K. Kozlov discovered in 1909 a library of Tangut texts which had been hidden in a suburgan.

Another Tangut report dated seven moon, 1224 (Kychanov 1971) mentions a person named "Uighur Rion" (Uighur Iron). He was supposedly identified by Kychanov (1974, p. 141) with Su-wei Pagoda-Iron, the author of the 1225 report. The 1224 report written less than a year before the report at issue here, is a petition to the emperor (no doubt, De-wang) of the defence commander of Khara-Khoto Ndziwuwa (in Kychanov's rendition) who asks to be transferred from Khara-Khoto to a place of service near to his aged mother. As a person who can substitute him, Ndziwuwa names "Uighur Rion". I believe that Kychanov's supposition is corroborated by the fact that the surname "Su" obviously reveals its foreign origin, since this surname is listed in the section "Chinese surnames" of the dictionary "Ideographic Miscellany" (Terent'ev-Katanskij forthcoming) and the surnames in this section, in my opinion, do not obligatory are Chinese, they are foreign, i.e. not of Tangut origin. In our case it is an Uighur surname. However, this foreign surname is "Tangut-shaped" (is "Tangutised"), since the word zwe "cross-cousin" is added — Su-wei. And such two-syllabled surnames are listed in the section "Tangut surnames" ("Ideographical Miscellany"), e.g. Ngu-wei. Even in the report at issue here there is an instance of such a two-syllabled surname — Ngwei-wei (line 13) (cf. similar situation in Russian — Russian-shaped surnames of Arab origin, such as Aliev, Yunusov, etc.).

Suzhou, to the south-east of Black River City — obviously the centre of the Western Court (see note 15).

The Son, to wit, De-wang's son.

Yizhou, Fengan county (?) obviously somewhere to the south of Black River city.

Western Court — one of the four Courts, centres of military administration of the Tangut state (the other three being the Northern, the Southern and the Eastern Courts).

A blank space, approximately one character, showing the beginning of the information received.

I translate the character pu as "the eldest son [of the emperor]" (such definition of this character is attested in Kepping et al. 1966, part. 2, p. 131, No. 4493). The meaning "the eldest son of the ruler, the heir" is used in the Tangut text of "The Grove of Categories" (Kepping 1983, p. 418). In the ritual song (see below) the word pu is applied to the same person — to the Tangut heir-hostage, the son of De-wang.

"Special harness" is a tentative translation of the collocation me nwin nia, literally: snout, throat, spirit-protector. Since one of De-wang's officials advised him to furnish his son sent as a hostage with all the signs of emperor's power, one may suppose that the horses had some special decorations as well (see the horses in the Tangut painting "Guanyin, Moon in Water", Piotrovsky ed. 1993, p. 199).
20 The translation "the route is safe" is tentative (literally: to go; one; face, side (Chinese mian).
21 The Tangut rank *ndzie* corresponds to the Chinese *tong-pan* — deputy prefect.
22 The character I translate as "barbarians" is *kin*. Such translation demands explanations. First of all it is to be noted that the shape of the character is not quite clear. Kychanov seemingly has read it as *ngie* "to dance", "to rejoice", but obviously this meaning makes no sense here. The character *kin* has two meanings: 1) auxiliary word, 2) transcriptional character. Since the first meaning does not fit here, I made a supposition that *kin* stands here for one of its omophones, namely, *kin* "barbarians, "foreigners" and (see Kepping et al. 1968, part 2, p. 185, No. 5107) "auxiliary word" and (No. 5105) "barbarians", "foreigners". Mind that there is one more homophone *kin* "insect" (No. 5106), i.e. the barbarians and foreigners were regarded as insects.
23 This phrase is obviously a formula used at the end of a report (see also report Tang. No. 2736) (Kychanov 1971).
24 This phrase is obviously a formula used at the end of a report (see also report Tang. No. 2736, ibid).
25 I have already touched upon ritual songs in (1994, p. 365). Chinese correspondence for ritual song is *ge*, whereas Tibetan — *ger*.
26 The text of the ritual songs written in Tangut cursive (which by itself represents a problem) was nearly lost in the process of restoration of the wood-block print in the 1960s, since less attention was paid to the reverse side of the wood-block print and as a result some cursive lines were lost and today only the reconstruction of some of the ritual songs made in the 1930s by the great Russian scholar N. A. Nevskij preserved the original text of the ritual songs.
27 Tang. 25 seemingly represents a corroboration for my idea that the content of Khara-Khoto suburgan "was a message to posterity" and "not just a heap of occasional articles" (Kepping 1999).
28 As a result, the translations of some pieces of Tangut poetry made so far turn to be a senseless word-by-word rendition of the Tangut text.
29 "The evil strangler" is a tentative translation.
30 "Had appeared" — the verb *ton* "to appear", "to come out" (Chin. correspondence *chu*) is preceded by the prefix *na* (shows direction downward). For the verb "to appear", "to come out" it is an unusual prefix: we should await here a prefix which shows direction upwards or out. Certainly such combination has a negative shade of meaning, but precisely what it is, I do not know.
31 "Ugly [person]-Rainbow" is a tentative translation. The adjective "ugly" is included as the last syllable into two-syllabled Tangut surnames and three syllabled name (Terent'ev-Katanskij forthcoming). However in this case it stands as the first syllable.
32 "The eldest son of the emperor" — see note 17.
33 Hors.
34 However this is not the only transcription of the name "Temujin": Daojuntibu (1980, passim) transcribes the first character as the surname Tie.